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Abstract: There is a difficulty in understanding Nietzsche’s epis-
temology. It is generally accepted that he endorses the naturalized 
epistemological view that knowledge should be closely connected to 
the sciences. He also holds the evolutionary epistemological posi-
tion that knowledge has developed exclusively to benefit human 
survival. Nietzsche’s evolutionary epistemology, however, appears 
to imply a debunking argument about the truth of our beliefs that 
seems to undermine his commitment to a naturalized epistemol-
ogy. This paper argues that Nietzsche’s evolutionary epistemology 
does not, in fact, undermine his naturalized epistemology.
There is a difficulty in understanding Nietzsche’s epistemology. It is generally accepted that he endorses the naturalized epistemologi-
cal view that knowledge should be closely connected to the sciences. 
Knowing the world requires us to “translate man back into nature” in 
part by appeal to “the discipline of science” (BGE 230, cf. GS 109).1 He 
also holds the evolutionary epistemological position that knowledge 
has developed exclusively to benefit human survival. He remarks, “All 
our organs and senses of knowledge are developed only with a view to 
conditions of preservation and growth” (KSA 12:9[38], cf. 13:14[122], 
11:36[19]; TL; GS 110). Nietzsche’s evolutionary epistemology, how-
ever, appears to imply a debunking argument about the truth of our 
beliefs that undermines a naturalized conception of epistemology. He 
remarks, “[A] belief, however necessary it may be for the preservation 
of a species, has nothing to do with truth” (KSA 12:7[63], cf. 13:14[122]). 
Elsewhere he asks, “How is truth proved? By the feeling of enhanced 
power—by utility—by indispensability—in short by advantages. . . . 
But that is a prejudice: a sign that truth is not involved at all—” (KSA 
13:15[58]).2 It seems that, if a belief benefits us, it is actually not true.3 
Since Nietzsche gives no indication that this skepticism does not extend 
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to scientific beliefs, we are left to wonder whether it is reasonable for 
him to embrace a naturalized epistemology.
 This paper explores the extent to which Nietzsche’s evolutionary 
epistemology undermines his naturalized epistemology. I first briefly 
lay out how we might understand Nietzsche’s naturalism. Afterward I 
develop his evolutionary debunking argument and examine a primary 
reason he gives for thinking that it might call into question beliefs sup-
ported by the sciences. This reason, I submit, does not imply a rejection 
of naturalized epistemology. I then suggest that Nietzsche can resist the 
self-undermining consequences of his own debunking argument by ap-
peal to scientific constructivism, roughly the radical thesis that all facts 
are socially constructed. I close by commenting on how Nietzsche can 
still endorse an evolutionary debunking argument that does genuinely 
interesting philosophical work.
I
Nietzsche endorses the naturalist position that philosophical explana-
tions aim to produce knowledge of the world and that such explanations 
should be closely associated with the sciences. There are different ways 
to understand this association. It could be the case that, for Nietz-
sche, philosophical explanations should be justified by the results of 
scientific inquiry or derived by methods that model scientific practice.4 
For example, philosophical explanations might attempt to understand 
phenomena by appeal to causal relations. It could also be that Nietz-
sche believes that, while many philosophical explanations should be 
continuous with scientific results or methods, understanding human 
activity is best done within a normative rather than scientific frame-
work.5 Human activity is typically guided by reasons rather than causes. 
These readings of Nietzsche’s naturalism maintain that naturalistic 
explanations are scientific explanations and that a scientific explanation 
is one sanctioned by the accepted sciences of the day. Another view is 
that Nietzsche adopts only the scientific principle that we should avoid 
justifying beliefs by appeal to anything beyond the possibility of expe-
rience.6 Nietzsche asks, “When will all these shadows of god no longer 
darken us? When will we have completely de-deified nature? When may 
we begin to naturalize humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly 
redeemed nature?” (GS 109). In addition to scientific explanations, it 
could be that genealogical, historical, or artful explanations “de-deify” 
nature. Of course, Nietzsche’s view of what, in particular, informs a 
naturalized epistemology is not at issue here. It is important simply to 
point out that Nietzsche thinks science—the “wisdom of this world” (A 
47)—should support our knowledge claims.s__
n__
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II
Nietzsche also subscribes to the evolutionary epistemological position 
that our cognitive apparatus has evolved to register only those features 
of the world that aid our survival. Evolutionary forces make utility the 
central explanatory feature of our beliefs. Assuming facts make propo-
sitions true, which Nietzsche appears to accept,7 his claim that a belief 
“necessary” for the “preservation of the species” has “nothing to do with 
truth” indicates that the pragmatic factors responsible for our beliefs 
are divorced from facts about the world.8 That is, there is no alethic 
explanation of our beliefs, where the explanation for the belief that p 
is alethic just in case the fact that p explains that belief.9 Nietzsche’s 
evolutionary debunking argument can then be reconstructed as follows:
1. If the ultimate explanation is the belief that p is not alethic, 
then it is unlikely that p is true.
2. The ultimate explanation is that the belief that p is not 
alethic.
3. So, it is unlikely that p is true.
The first premise reflects a plausible constraint on truth. If there indeed 
is a separation between a belief ’s content and the factors that lead to the 
belief, then it could only be by extreme coincidence if the belief turned 
out to be correct. The second premise claims there is such a separation. 
Now, one might reasonably think useful beliefs are useful because they 
are true. But Nietzsche apparently resists this: “[U]tility,” he says, is “a 
sign that truth is not involved at all” (KSA 13:15[58]). The key issue 
to examine is how he justifies this controversial claim, especially with 
respect to beliefs supported by the sciences.
III
The best reason Nietzsche provides for thinking the ultimate explanation 
for our scientific beliefs is not alethic is that knowledge claims necessarily 
falsify the world.10 He believes our mode of cognition has evolved wholly 
in relation to what is advantageous and advantageous representations 
simplify the world, such that “the entire apparatus for knowledge is an 
apparatus for abstraction and simplification” (KSA 11:26[61]). This is 
important because Nietzsche often equates simplification with falsifica-
tion.11 For example, he writes:
The spirit’s power to appropriate the foreign stands revealed in its 
inclination to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold 
. . . —just as it involuntarily emphasizes certain features and lines in __s
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what is foreign, . . . retouching and falsifying the whole to suit itself 
(BGE 230, emphasis added).12
The point extends to scientific discourse: “The best science [die beste 
Wissenschaft] seeks most to keep us in this simplified, . . . suitably 
falsified world” (BGE 24, translation modified). Nietzsche’s reasoning 
is likely that something simplified is inexact, and something inexact is 
not literally true.13 Thus, simplifications are falsifications.
 Nietzsche appears to think knowledge claims falsify because cogni-
tive representation is ubiquitously inexact. On his account, cognitive 
representation is inexact because representational consciousness is a 
product of the need to communicate using concepts that simplify the 
world by generalizing over particulars (see GS 354). Other features of 
representational consciousness function similarly. For instance, logical 
and mathematical syntax render particulars equal and identical.14 These 
considerations lead Nietzsche to conclude that “all becoming conscious 
involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, 
and generalization” (GS 354).
 On Nietzsche’s view, the advantageous nature of simplifying perceptual 
information into a manageable system is the ultimate cause of our beliefs, 
including our scientific beliefs. It then seems tremendously unlikely that 
conscious representations pick out facts about the world. Our faculties 
have developed to cope with the indefinite complexity of experience 
regardless of how the world might truly be. Falsification is a matter of 
evolutionary necessity. Of course, science can compensate for some of our 
representational limitations through devices such as telescopes, micro-
scopes, and the like, but these machines can only enhance our particular 
mode of cognition, which is, for Nietzsche, ubiquitously simplifying.
IV
One might conclude that Nietzsche’s evolutionary view of representa-
tional consciousness is incompatible with truth. There are certainly 
commentators who argue that Nietzsche rejects the existence of truth.15 
My view is that, for Nietzsche, truth is a property of simplified repre-
sentations. In a striking notebook entry, he writes, “Truth is the kind of 
error without which a particular kind of living creature could not live” 
(KSA 11:34[253], see also TL; GS 265). The idea that truth is a “kind” 
of falsification suggests truth is a certain manner in which a claim is 
false. On Nietzsche’s account, truths are a certain kind of inexact rep-
resentation.
 Of course, statements are often thought to be true or false, full stop, 
not both at the same time. Yet, Nietzsche asks,
s__
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lc
HPQ 32_2 text.indd   184 2/9/15   1:47 PM
 EVOLUTIONARY AND NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY 185
[W]hat forces us at all to suppose that there is an essential opposi-
tion of “true” and “false”? Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of 
apparentness and, as it were, lighter and darker shadows and shades 
of appearance—different “values,” to use the language of painters? 
(BGE 34)
These questions are clearly rhetorical. They indicate that, for Nietzsche, 
truth indeed comes in “degrees” or “shades.” This means that truth is 
approximate.16 A representation is approximately true to the extent 
that what it describes is similar to the target described. Our interests 
are necessary for specifying this relation of similarity. Assessing the 
accuracy of approximate representations is like assessing the accuracy 
of models, such as roadmaps, in the sense that our interests are crucial 
for determining the parameters that constitute representational success. 
The truth conditions of approximate representations can be determinate 
only in relation to our interests. Evaluating those conditions requires 
specifying which interests are relevant and in what respects. For Nietz-
sche, a representation can be true to its target only in approximations 
indexed to our concerns.17
 Nietzsche’s view that truth is approximate is consistent with his posi-
tion that knowledge claims necessarily falsify. An inexact representation 
can also be accurate if it falls within the parameters that determine 
representational success. Consider the statement that Erin is six feet 
tall.18 No one is six feet tall exactly. The length of our backbones fluctu-
ates throughout the day. Of course, we could specify a particular time to 
measure Erin’s height, but this is an idealization that requires idealizing 
further variables, such as posture, how much skin-cell surface to include, 
and so forth. Nonetheless, the inexact statement that Erin is six feet tall 
is an accurate representation if the discrepancy between the measure 
of Erin’s being six feet tall and any measure that includes negligible 
attributes falls inside the boundaries that constitute representational 
success. In this sense, literally false statements can be approximately 
true.
 So, Nietzsche holds that knowledge claims falsify because they are 
inexact and that truth is possible in an approximate sense. Importantly, 
he thinks accurate approximate representations will be those delivered 
by the sciences. “All evidence of truth comes only from the senses” (BGE 
134), he remarks, and “we possess science nowadays precisely to the 
extent that we decided to accept the evidence of the senses” (TI “Reason” 
3). Hence, the justification for the evolutionary debunking argument on 
offer, the idea that the explanation of our scientific beliefs fails to be 
alethic because knowledge claims necessarily falsify, does not undermine 
Nietzsche’s ability to embrace a naturalized epistemology. __s
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V
A worry remains. It is one thing to say that truth is possible despite 
systematic falsification, but it is quite another to say that conscious 
representations actually represent facts. What evidence do we have for 
thinking that, on Nietzsche’s account, scientific beliefs have an alethic 
explanation? Without such evidence, it seems a naturalized epistemology 
is doomed. I suggest the evidence is a result of Nietzsche’s commitment 
to scientific constructivism, specifically the thesis that all facts that are 
in principle graspable are socially constructed.19 If Nietzsche were com-
mitted to a constructivist conception of science, there would be strong 
reason to think accurate approximate representations are explained 
by facts. Having true scientific beliefs would be largely a matter of 
constructing facts.
 Nietzsche regularly mentions facts,20 and, although he never explic-
itly discusses what a fact is, some passages provide useful hints. For 
instance, in contrast to philosophers who assume there are “unalterable 
facts of mankind,” he asserts “everything has become: there are no eter-
nal facts, just as there are no absolute truths” (HH I: 2). Facts do not 
obtain without change over time, presumably because facts depend on 
our interpretations, which are indexed to developing needs, interests, 
and values.21 Now, facts might depend on our interpretations in the sense 
that they are obtaining states of affairs that require interpretation to 
be intelligible as facts. As one distinguished commentator explains, for 
Nietzsche “There are ‘facts’ only in the context of interpretations which 
endow our experiences with whatever ‘meaning’ they have.”22 Nietzsche 
does claim that “a meaning must always be projected” before there can 
be “‘facts’” (KSA 12: 2[149]). Yet he seems to embrace a stronger position:
There are no “facts-in-themselves,” for a meaning must always be 
projected into them before they can be “facts.”[23] The question “what 
is that?” is an establishment of meaning from some other viewpoint. 
The “essence,” the “essential nature,” is something perspectival (KSA 
12:2[149]).
A fact in itself is a fact in principle inaccessible by any method available 
to our mode of cognition. Nietzsche suggests facts in themselves do not 
exist because facthood depends on the identities of objects established 
through meaningful interpretation. We must determine “what” some-
thing is, or determine its “perspectival” “essential nature,” for there to 
be facts. It then appears that a fact is just an object instantiating a 
property. On this view of facts, scientific constructivism is implied by 
object constructivism, the thesis that the identities of all objects that are 
in principle graspable are socially constructed. If object o has property 
F by virtue of social construction, then the fact that o has F is by virtue 
s__
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of social construction. So, if Nietzsche embraces object constructivism, 
then he is most likely to embrace scientific constructivism.24
 Nietzsche endorses object constructivism. He remarks, for example, 
“[I]t is enough to create new names and valuations . . . to create new 
‘things’” (GS 58).25 “Thing” appears scare-quoted because Nietzsche 
holds the unorthodox view that something’s being an object depends 
on our activities. Objecthood depends on our activities because “[a] 
‘thing’ is the sum of its effects, synthetically united by a concept” (KSA 
13:14[98]).26 The idea of synthetic unity by a concept clearly comes from 
Kant. For Kant, we are passively in contact with an undifferentiated 
sensory manifold, and unifying sense impressions to represent objects 
occurs by virtue of the application of an innate system of nonempirical 
concepts. Nietzsche agrees with Kant that concepts organize incoming 
sense data, but, unlike Kant, he seems to believe all concepts derive 
from the empirical world in relation to our contingent needs, interests, 
and values (see, for example, KSA 12:9[98]). For Nietzsche concepts 
organize “effects,” or simply properties,27 and such organization occurs 
only in relation to our concerns: “A thing = its qualities; but these equal 
everything which matters to us about that thing; a unity under which we 
collect the relations that may be of some account to us” (KSA 12:2[77]). 
Objects are then constructed by creating concepts that unify groups of 
properties in relation to our interests.28
 The following example can help illuminate Nietzsche’s object con-
structivism and how it implies scientific constructivism. The concept 
<planet> has been newly modified to refer only to an object that orbits 
our sun, remains nearly round, and does not have any bodies of compa-
rable size other than its own satellites under its gravitational influence. 
Our interpretation of <planet> groups together these features and, in 
doing so, determines the application conditions of the property of being a 
planet. Application conditions are conditions that apply to our concepts 
that predicate properties, and identity conditions are conditions that 
govern the objects (if any) to which those concepts refer.29 For Nietz-
sche, application conditions fix the conditions of identity for whatever 
satisfies them. The identities of objects such as planets depend on our 
descriptions because, when we fashion <planet>, we determine the ap-
plication conditions of the property of being a planet. When we decide 
on these conditions, we also establish facts about which objects are and 
are not planets. Such facts do not exist independently of our actions. 
For Nietzsche, there is no ontologically significant difference between 
planets and other objects of experience. So, presumably, a similar argu-
ment can be made for any other object of experience. “The best science 
[die beste Wissenschaft],” Nietzsche explains, delivers a world “suitably 
constructed” (BGE 24, emphasis added, translation modified).30
__s
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 Accurate approximate representations are, therefore, likely to be 
explained by facts because we play an essential role in constructing 
facts. On Nietzsche’s view, constructing facts is critical for helping us 
navigate our environment, since “we can comprehend only a world that 
we ourselves have made” (KSA 11:25[470], cf. GS 301). Our particular 
mode of cognition may be a contingent development of evolutionary 
forces, but this need not imply that our representations are divorced 
from facts about the world.
 Nietzsche’s view that true beliefs likely track facts because we help 
construct facts is neither circular nor question begging. There are con-
straints on constructing facts, most importantly sensory information.31 
Since sense data are not arbitrary and should not be ignored when or-
ganizing the world into objects in one way rather than another, accurate 
approximate representations are not explained by facts merely because 
we play a role in constructing facts. So Nietzsche’s view is not circular. 
His position is also not question begging. In a famous passage, he says 
“[T]here is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’” (GM 
III: 12). For Nietzsche, we cannot represent something fully indepen-
dent of our representations of it, such as Kantian things in themselves. 
Representations can be compared only to other representations. The 
accuracy of a representation can then be judged only relative to other 
representations, which are indexed to differently specified sets of con-
cerns. Since there are an infinite number of such sets, the view that we 
aid in constituting facts does not assume all approximate representa-
tions will be accurate. Once facts are constructed, we can succeed or fail 
to represent them accurately.
VI
I have argued that the debunking argument that seems to be a con-
sequence of Nietzsche’s evolutionary epistemology does not provide 
sufficient reason to reject a naturalized conception of epistemology. What 
are we to make of the two passages quoted at the outset that suggest 
Nietzsche embraces the evolutionary debunking argument? The first 
is as follows:
[A] belief, however necessary it may be for the preservation of a spe-
cies, has nothing to do with truth, one knows that from the fact that, 
e.g., we have to believe in time, space, and motion, without feeling 
compelled to grant them absolute reality (KSA 12:7[63]).
Beliefs formed through evolutionary means have “nothing to do with 
truth” only if truth requires some “absolute reality,” which, for Nietzsche, 
is a fully mind-independent world. In this passage, Nietzsche is denying 
a Kantian metaphysical-correspondence theory of truth, which errone-
s__
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ously assumes that we can represent something completely independent 
of our representations of it.32 A rejection of this theory of truth implies 
that advantageous beliefs can be true.
 The second passage that appears to endorse the evolutionary debunk-
ing argument is this:
How is truth proved? By the feeling of enhanced power—by utility—by 
indispensability—in short by advantages. . . . But that is a prejudice: 
a sign that truth is not involved at all—(KSA 13:15[58]).
But notice the lines immediately preceding it:
The advantages that one anticipated from truth were advantages 
resulting from belief in it:—in itself, that is, truth could be altogether 
painful, harmful, fateful—. One likewise disputed the “truth” only 
when one promised oneself advantages from one’s victory—e.g., free-
dom from the ruling powers.
 The methods of truth were not invented from the motives of truth, 
but from motives of power, from wanting to be superior. (Ibid.).
When Nietzsche claims that “advantages” are “a sign that truth is not 
involved at all,” he does not mean that our cognitive apparatus has 
evolved never to reflect truths. Rather, he means that the motivations 
to affirm or deny truth are often rooted in a desire for social advantage, 
particularly “wanting to be superior.” This claim stands or falls inde-
pendently of any claim about the truth of evolutionary epistemology.
 So the primary passages that seem to pit Nietzsche’s evolutionary 
debunking argument against a naturalized epistemology fail to do so. 
Of course, this does not imply that Nietzsche denies that we should 
understand epistemology through an evolutionary lens. I have argued 
only that his evolutionary epistemology does not threaten the truth of 
beliefs closely connected with the sciences.33 Moreover, nothing consid-
ered here implies that Nietzsche does not utilize evolutionary debunking 
arguments. In fact, he often employs such arguments to challenge beliefs 
that cannot be naturalized. For example, he writes,
Historical refutation as the definitive refutation.—In former times, one 
sought to prove that there is no God—today one indicates how the 
belief that there is a God could arise and how this belief acquired its 
weight and importance: a counter-proof that there is no God thereby 
becomes superfluous (D 95, see also GM II: 16 ff.).
Nietzsche famously does not construct formal arguments against God’s 
existence, such as showing that the necessary features of God are logi-
cally incompatible with the nature of God’s manifestation in the world. 
Instead, he presents debunking arguments that elucidate biological 
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and cultural factors involved in the emergence of belief in God that ef-
fectively undermine our reasons for accepting that belief. This renders 
traditional arguments “superfluous.” Debunking arguments are crucial 
for Nietzsche because they expose erroneous beliefs and clear a path 
for alternative positions. Assessing these new positions seems to be the 
task of an epistemology in close relation with the sciences.
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intrinsic perspectival natures (see Steven Hales and Rex Welshon, Nietzsche’s 
Perspectivism [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000], 72; and Tsarnia Doyle, 
Nietzsche on Epistemology and Metaphysics: The World in View [Edinburgh: Ed-
inburgh University Press, 2009], 177). But this view faces difficulties. Nietzsche 
suggests that intrinsic properties, or properties an object has (if any) that are 
at least ontologically independent of our actions, fail to constitute an object’s 
identity (KSA 12:9[40]). There is even good reason to believe Nietzsche rejects 
intrinsic properties (see KSA 13:14[153], 13:14[79]). “Perspectivism,” most ba-
sically understood as the view that each force has a perspective, is compatible 
with such a rejection. Perspectives ontologically depend on other perspectives. 
My view is that the objecthood of a bundle of forces is ontologically dependent 
on our activities. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising these concerns.
25. Cf. KSA 12:2[77], 12:9[144], 11:35[35], 13:14[98], 12:2[150], 12:2[152], 
12:5[19].
26. The “its” in this sentence is best read as a placeholder for a group of 
properties to which a concept is applied.
27. Specifically, for Nietzsche, properties are the “effects” of the interac-
tions of forces at the microscopic level of reality (see KSA 12:2[85], 13:14[184], 
13:14[93], 12:14[79]).
28. For an extended presentation and defense of the view that Nietzsche em-
braces object constructivism, see my “Nietzsche on Objects,” Nietzsche-Studien 
(forthcoming). For other versions of Nietzsche’s constructivism, see Nehamas, 
Nietzsche, chap. 2; R. Lanier Anderson, “Truth and Objectivity in Perspectivism,” 
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in Synthese 115 (1998): 1–32; Cristoph Cox, Nietzsche: Naturalism and Inter-
pretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 152–63. Nietzsche’s 
object constructivism prefigures similar positions defended later by William 
James, in Pragmatism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), 
and Nelson Goodman, in Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1978).
29. Cf. Amie Thomasson, Ordinary Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 56–67.
30. There are two recent nonconstructivist Kantian-informed readings of 
Nietzsche. Kevin Hill, in Nietzsche’s Critiques: the Kantian Foundations of His 
Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), asks how Nietzsche can dis-
tinguish a reality that depends on human interpreters from a mind-dependent 
reality not currently perceived by human interpreters (138). Hill holds that 
Nietzsche adopts the panpsychist view that reality consists in forces and forces 
are minded. So, nothing goes unobserved. Nietzsche’s texts, however, suggest a 
different response to the problem. Nietzsche appears to adopt Kant’s position 
that reality not currently perceived by us exists because reality is what we 
can encounter in possible experience (see Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood [Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998]: A496/B524-A497/B525; KSA 5:19, 12:2[154], D 48, cf. KSA 12:9[91], 
12:7[49]). This solidifies Nietzsche’s object constructivism. Tsarnia Doyle, in 
Nietzsche on Epistemology and Metaphysics, also defends a nonconstructiv-
ist Kantian reading. For Doyle, Nietzsche thinks Kant’s view that objects are 
constitutively dependent on innate concepts is indistinguishable from the 
problematic idealist view that objects are mere mental representations (26, 
30–32). This motivates Nietzsche to reject Kant’s account that concepts partially 
constitute objecthood and adopt instead the Kantian position that concepts 
are regulative tools that establish the guiding framework for inquiry (35–43). 
Unfortunately, Doyle fails to challenge the many passages in Nietzsche that 
report that objects are constructed entities—and these entities are not merely 
ideas. Object constructivism also assumes that concepts play a regulative role 
in inquiry. Concepts guide inquiry by organizing our environment into objects. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing these issues.
31. See BGE 134; TI “Reason 3”; KSA 12:5[19].
32. Here I agree with Maudemarie Clark in her Nietzsche on Truth and 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). My account is 
crucially different from Clark’s, however. Clark argues that, for Nietzsche, true 
beliefs correspond to mind-independent, ordinary objects of experience (31, 40, 
107, 121). On this view, “the world exists independently of our representations 
of it” (40) in the sense that objects are “ontologically . . . distinct from know-
ers and their representations” (45). My constructivist interpretation is, then, 
incompatible with Clark’s reading.
33. What might threaten the truth of our beliefs in close relation with 
the sciences is what Clark and Dudrick call the “will to value” (see The Soul 
of Nietzsche’s “Beyond Good and Evil.” Clark and Dudrick hold that, in BGE, 
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Nietzsche lays out a tension between the will to truth, exemplified by naturalist 
inquiry, and the will to value, exemplified by our tendency to see the world as it 
ought to be. Understanding the will to value requires a normative framework, 
one that refers to a space of reasons. So Clark and Dudrick separate the empiri-
cal from the normative. Nietzsche’s commitment to scientific constructivism, 
however, suggests that, for him, naturalist inquiry will always be constitutively 
dependent on our rational activity. On a constructivist conception of science, 
the determinate nature of empirical phenomena can properly be understood 
only by appeal to the judgments agents make about that phenomena.
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